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Democracy creates an often precarious balance between the needs of 
the individual and the needs of the whole. To shelter individuals from the 
passions of the day, the Founding Fathers enumerated certain rights and 
established constitutional protections. As the ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States uses these rights 
and protections as tools to weigh the needs of the individual against the 
needs of the whole. In the last two decades, however, a war on drugs in 
the United States has been used to justify infringements upon traditional 
property rights and due process. The antiquated concept of forfeiture 
has become one of the primary weapons in this drug war and, as such, is 
often the device by which individual rights are sacrificed. 
With origins dating back to the Old Testament, the concept of for-
feiture is not new.1 Its modem application in the United States developed 
from the English common Jaw tradition which allowed for three types of 
forfeiture, all of which were understood to impose punishment. First, 
under English common law, the word "deodand" was used to describe an 
object deemed responsible for a death. A cart under which someone was 
crushed, for example, might have been forfeited as a deodand. The legal 
term In rem was applied to deodand proceedings because the subject of 
forfeiture in these cases was insentient. The second type of forfeiture 
allowed under English common law was In personam. This ·meant that 
the act of forfeiture was taken against a person rather than an insentient 
object. Under this concept, those convicted of a felony or treason were 
deprived of their estates. The third and final form of forfeiture allowed 
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under English common law was statutory forfeiture. As in the case of 
deodands, such proceedings were in rem and were allowed as a penalty 
for violations of customs and revenue laws.2 
England introduced forfeiture to the New World as a tool to enforce 
the Navigation Acts in the American colonies. The Navigation Act of 
1660, for example, required that English vessels be used to transport 
most commodities. Violation of these acts resulted in the forfeiture not 
only of goods, but also the ships in which they were carried. Colonists 
opposed this use of forfeiture because they resented sending profit to the 
Crown. They also opposed the law because it allowed the British to try 
maritime cases without a jury. In one such case involving two now-
famous colonists, attorney John Adams defended merchant John 
Hancock against a charge of evading customs duties. Adams argued 
that the action against Hancock should be dropped because the forfeiture 
proceeding denied Hancock his right to a trial by jury.3 
After the Revolutionary War, forfeiture law was incorporated into the 
American legal system. Based on the English concept of statutory 
forfeiture, the early American version allowed for the seizure of ships and 
cargos when import duties were not paid and for the seizure of vessels 
used to deliver slaves.4 Lawgivers, believing that property was a natural 
right and a cornerstone of liberty, drafted the law so as to limit 
government authority over personal property. For example, in personam 
estate forfeiture was not embraced because it deprived not only 
convicted felons, but also their families, of property.5 The concept of 
deodands, in which insentient objects were the subject of forfeiture, was 
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also never formally incorporated into American jurisprudence. In fact, it 
was eliminated from English law in 1646 when accidental deaths due to 
industrialization and urbanization made it increasingly difficult to view 
forfeiture as a deterrent to negligence.6 Well into the nineteenth century, 
forfeiture proceedings in the United States were generally limited to 
Admiralty cases. In the early twentieth century, forfeiture was also used 
for a short time to enforce Prohibition.7 
Forfeiture as a deterrent against illegal activity resurfaced in the 
United States in the late twentieth century, shortly after President Richard 
Nixon's successful law and order campaign of 1968. The Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, passed in 1970 as part of 
the Controlled Substances Act, included forfeiture provisions. The 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 also allowed for forfeiture 
proceedings. While this use of forfeiture was intended to provide law 
enforcement with a weapon against illegal drug activity, these new laws 
fell far short of expectations. In 1980, a Senate judiciary subcommittee 
on criminal justice conducted hearings on the effectiveness of the 1970 
laws and acknowledged that forfeiture was failing in the nation's war on 
drugs.8 
By the early 1980s, Congress responded to public concern over the 
illegal drug trade and focused its efforts on anti-drug legislation. It 
targeted the traffickers' financial incentive by including civil forfeiture 
provisions in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.9 Measured 
only by the value of seized assets, this law appears to have been 
effective. In 1965, the government seized $27.2 million in forfeiture 
proceedings; by 1994, this amount increased to $649.7 million. The total 
value of assets seized by federal agencies since 1990 is estimated to 
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have been approximately $2.7 billion.10 The proliferation of forfeiture laws 
and the value of seized assets, however, are inadequate tools in 
measuring the success of America's war on drugs. Even statistics on 
drug trafficking are of little use, since it is impossible to know what impact 
forfeiture has had on such statistics. More importantly, the value of 
seized assets and other statistics offer an incomplete picture. A thorough 
analysis of forfeiture also requires consideration of less tangible issues, 
such as the possible infringement of individual liberties. 
While there is the chance for error in the application of any law, the 
statistically insignificant potential for such an error is generally deemed 
less compelling than the potential benefit of the law to society. Civil 
forfeiture, however, creates the potential for an innocent person to be 
victimized by allowing the seizure of property without an arrest or 
conviction. In recent years, media reports have brought the plight of 
innocent owners victimized by forfeiture to the attention of the American 
public. Such reports include the case of a Colombian businessman 
whose $400,000 Cessna plane was seized in Miami by the Drug 
Enforcement Agency. Although the owner later proved to be a legitimate 
businessman who was planning to use the plane in his emerald mining 
business, it took two years and $75,000 in legal fees for the plane to be 
returned.11 In 1992, a sixty-one-year-old California millionaire was shot to 
death during a raid which had been prompted by a false tip that 
marijuana was being grown on his ranch. The local district attorney 
determined that the raid was prompted, at least in part, by a desire to 
acquire the property for resale.12 Opponents of forfeiture argue that the 
law increases the danger for such victimization of innocent persons by 
providing a financial incentive for law enforcement agencies to be overly 
aggressive in their application of the law. 
Potential revenue streams, which are built into many forfeiture laws, 
may thus serve as unintentional incentives for abuse by law enforcement 
agencies. Under federal law, forfeited assets are placed into a fund from 
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which disbursements are made to the Federal Bureau of Prisons and for 
drug enforcement activities that are part of the national drug control 
strategy. In addition, any law enforcement agency that participates in the 
seizure of assets may also request a part of the proceeds. At the state 
level, forfeited assets may be kept locally or even be put into the state's 
general fund. 13 With millions of dollars at stake, this revenue provides a 
powerful temptation for law enforcement agencies to be overly aggres-
sive in their application of forfeiture law.14 Because the forfeiture 
activities of law enforcement personnel are relatively unregulated, it is 
difficult to identify the extent to which forfeiture may be abused.15 Given 
this background it is not surprising that civil forfeiture has become a 
frequent target of constitutional attacks. 
One such constitutional challenge is the claim that forfeiture denies 
property owners procedural due process. To understand this argument, 
a distinction must be made between civil and criminal forfeiture. In 
criminal forfeiture proceedings, a person convicted of a crime may be 
compelled to forfeit property if it can be linked to the crime for which the 
property owner is convicted. Because it is a criminal proceeding, the 
individual is guaranteed procedural due process, meaning that he is 
guaranteed both notice and an opportunity to be heard. As with any 
criminal charge, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. By 
contrast, the government need only show probable cause in order to 
seize property as part of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Hearsay, circum-
stantial evidence, or facts obtained after the seizure may all be used to 
demonstrate probable cause; neither an arrest nor a conviction is 
required. Once property has been seized, the burden of proof shifts to 
the owner. In order to reclaim the property, the owner must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that his seized property was not connected to 
the illegal activity. 16 The constitutionality of the government's right to take 
property in civil forfeiture proceedings without the same procedural due 
process afforded in criminal proceedings was challenged before the 
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Supreme Court of the United States in Van Oster v. Kansas (1926).17 
Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan F. Stone said that "[i]t has long 
been settled that statutory forfeitures of property intrusted by the innocent 
owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of 
the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment." The Rehnquist Court agreed in Bennis v. Michigan (1996), 
when it ruled that the forfeiture of a car which had been used in the com-
mission of a crime did not violate the owner's right to procedural due 
process.18 
Opponents of civil forfeiture have fared somewhat better in Constitu-
tional challenges based upon the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. Identifying punishment as a determinant for when limits are 
constitutionally guaranteed by the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court 
found in Austin v. United States (1993) that forfeiture served both a 
remedial and a punitive function. Speaking for the Court, Justice Harry 
Blackmun said that since forfeiture represents payment to a sovereign as 
punishment, it is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.19 The Court thus acknowledged that there is a limit to what 
may be seized from an individual in a civil forfeiture proceeding. 
For the Austin ruling to extend any real protection to property owners, 
a standard must exist with which to measure forfeiture. In Austin, 
however, the Court specifically declined to establish such a test and 
deferred the question to the lower courts. In a concurring opinion in 
Austin, Justice Antonin Scalia suggested a proportionality test when he 
said that "the relevant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture . . . is the 
relationship of the property to the offense: was it close enough to render 
the property under traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable?"20 
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Following Justice Scalia's example, some lower courts use such a 
proportionality test. In doing so, they often rely on So/em v. Helm (1983), 
in which the Court established a principle of proportionality in applying 
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
Writing the opinion for a split Court in So/em, Justice Lewis Powell 
concluded that requirement of proportionality between punishment and 
crime is well-established in American jurisprudence.21 However, this 
reliance on So/em is questionable in light of the Court's subsequent 
decision in Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), in which a majority of the Court 
appeared to either repudiate or limit So/em. In Harmelin, Justice Scalia, 
joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, found that proportionality of 
sentence to crime is not a determinant of cruel or unusual punishment. 
Acknowledging that there were differences between the circumstances of 
the So/em and Harmelin cases, Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day 
O'Connor, and David Souter said that proportionality is applicable to 
Eighth Amendment protections only in extreme cases.22 The Supreme 
Court's inconsistency and its unwillingness to provide a measurement for 
what constitutes excessive forfeiture allow for confusion in the lower 
courts and provide the opportunity for further limitations on individual 
rights. 
The distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings is 
especially unclear when a person facing the civil forfeiture of property has 
also been convicted of a crime. In such a case, the issue of double 
jeopardy must be considered. According to the Fifth Amendment, no 
person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeo-
pardy ."23 This means that a person cannot be tried twice in the same 
legal jurisdiction or punished twice for the same crime. When forfeiture 
was incorporated into the American legal system, English common law 
forfeiture statues were narrowed to include only in rem proceedings. In 
other words, this treatment of forfeiture allowed for legal action to be 
taken against property, not person. Although opponents claim that civil 
forfeiture and criminal sentencing represent double punishment for the 
same crime and are thus in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has consistently rejected this contention by relying on the 
21 So/em v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
22Harmelinv. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
23United States Constitution, amendment 5. 
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antiquated principle that forfeiture is a legal action against property rather 
than person. As early as 1827, the Court found that the forfeiture 
proceeding in question was taken against the property and not the owner. 
In The Palmyra, the Court considered the forfeiture of a sailing vessel 
which had been captured by the United States for privateering and deter-
mined that the ship rather than its owner was the offender.24 
In recent years, the Court has consistently agreed with nineteenth 
century rulings in holding that civil forfeiture does not represent double 
jeopardy. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms (1984), the 
Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit forfeiture 
proceedings against the property of an individual who has been acquitted 
of a crime to which the property was linked.25 In United States v. Ursery 
(1996), the Court found that civil in rem forfeiture did not represent 
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the 
Court's finding in Ursery appears to be in direct conflict with its 
holding in Austin, the Court distinguished the way in which punishment is 
viewed for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause versus the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. In fact, the Court specifically said in Ursery that 
nothing in several earlier cases, including Austin, modified the long-
standing rule that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment subject to 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.26 
Perhaps the person to whom the most grievous constitutional injury is 
done is the property owner completely innocent of any crime. Because 
an arrest and conviction are not required in a civil forfeiture proceeding, 
there are times in which the owner whose property has been seized is 
innocent of any wrongdoing. However, the Court has consistently found 
that the innocence of the owner is not a protection from forfeiture. In 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), for example, the 
Court specifically rejected the innocent owner defense.27 The Court 
subsequently found in Bennis v. Michigan (1996) that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not offer protection to inno-
cent owners. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that 
24 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1 (1827). 
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property could be forfeited even if the owner did not know that it was 
being used for illegal purposes.28 Because of the Court's unyielding 
position on this issue, individuals may be subject to the loss of their 
property through civil forfeiture even though they are unaware of specific 
criminal activity. 
Historical precedent provides many other situations in which individual 
rights were suppressed because of perceived threats to society. The 
Confiscation Act of 1862, for example, allowed in rem forfeiture as a 
punishment for rebels who owned property in the North. In 1871, a seven 
to two majority of the Supreme Court upheld the act, ruling that it was an 
exercise of war powers. Justice Stephen Field argued in dissent that the 
act should not have been sustained because it allowed punitive action 
against persons guilty of treason rather than the enemy, thus making it 
something other than an exercise of the government's war powers.29 The 
Court's handling of the Confiscation Act was a situation in which the crisis 
of war was used to justify the infringement of individual rights. In the 
same way. Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese 
ancestry were relocated to military camps during the war years of the 
early 1940s. The Supreme Court allowed this relocation because of a 
perceived threat to American society. Called "the most serious invasion 
of individual rights by the federal government in the history of the 
country," the relocation program was another example of individual rights 
being sacrificed because of a perceived threat.30 A decade later, the 
United States found itself in the panic of Cold War and used this threat to 
again limit individual rights. The fear of Communism gave rise to the 
House Un-American Activities Committee as well as to Senator Joseph 
McCarthy's hunt for communists in the government. At issue was a 
citizen's right to speak out in favor of communist ideology in·light of the 
preferred position of First Amendment rights. In the early 1950s, when 
anti-communist sentiment was at its apex, the Supreme Court justified 
limits to free speech because of the perceived threat posed by 
subversive rhetoric. In Dennis v. United States (1951 ), the Court upheld 
28Bennis v. Michigan, 994. 
29Levy, A Ucense to Steal, 51-56 [referring to Page, excr. of Samuel Miller, v. 
United States, 78 U.S. 268 (1871)]. 
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the government's right to restrict citizens from advocating not only the 
overthrow of the government but also the advocacy of a conspiracy to do 
so.31 Justice William 0. Douglas acknowledged the impact of public 
opinion on the Court. Referring to the Court's refusal in 1953 to hear the 
appeal of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who were charged with conspiracy 
to commit treason, Justice Douglas acknowledged that "perhaps the 
Justices did not feel any immediate threat of Communism, but they 
certainly were aware of the hysteria that beset our people, and that 
hysteria touched off the Justices also. I have no other way of explaining 
why they ran pell-mell with the mob in the Rosenberg case."32 
In their interpretation of the Constitution, justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States must strike a balance between the needs of 
society and the needs of individuals so that both may be best served. 
While this requires flexibility in interpretation, it can also result in the 
scales being tipped so far in favor of public needs and passions that 
individual rights can be crushed. While there are certainly situations in 
which individual liberties must give way to the greater public good, it is 
unclear whether the war on drugs appropriately justifies the constitutional 
infringements caused by forfeiture. This is particularly true when the 
effectiveness of forfeiture in combating illegal drug activity is a virtual 
unknown. Although the United States was not at war or threatened by a 
foreign power when forfeiture laws were revitalized in the 1980s, a 
domestic war on illegal drug activity was being waged. This was the 
conservative era of the Reagan administration, during which public 
sentiment supported an aggressive attack on illegal drug activity. By 
enacting forfeiture legislation, Congress heeded cries from the admin-
istration as well as the public and offered what it felt was a deterrent to 
crime and drug trafficking. In the 1990s, the conservative Rehnquist 
Court has been obliged to weigh the potential benefit of this deterrent 
against the risk to individual liberties and has generally broadened the 
scope of forfeiture while limiting individual rights. 
With considerable justification, public passions are now inflamed by 
the perceived prevalence of street crime and its relation to drug use. As 
the historical accounts discussed above demonstrate, the Supreme 
Court is never totally unaffected by the passions of the day. While 
31 Dennis v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 857 (1951). 
32William 0. Douglas, The Court Years, 1939-1975 (New York: Random House, 
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constitutional jurisprudence must be flexible enough to permit an effective 
response in times of crisis, it must not allow the tradition of procedural 
due process to be worn down by public passions. One of the primary 
motivations behind the Bill of Rights was to protect the individual from just 
such influence. According to James Madison, author of the Bill of Rights: 
the prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be leveled 
against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, 
namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of 
power. But this is not found in either the Executive or 
Legislative departments of Government, but in the body of 
the people, operating by the majority against the minority. It 
may be thought that all paper barriers against the power of 
the community are too weak to be worthy of attention; . . . 
yet as they have a tendency to impress some degree of 
respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their 
favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it 
may be one means to control the majority from those acts to 
which they might be otherwise inclined.33 
In times of perceived national crisis the Supreme Court should thus be 
more vigilant, not less, in ensuring that all citizens receive the benefits of 
the protections contained in the Bill of Rights. 
33Quoted in Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (Char1ottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1990), 290. 
